Denver Law Review
Volume 57
Issue 2 Tenth Circuit Surveys

Article 7

January 1980

Commercial Law
Linda K. Calloway

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/dlr

Recommended Citation
Linda K. Calloway, Commercial Law, 57 Denv. L.J. 165 (1980).

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Denver Law Review at Digital Commons @ DU. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Denver Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ DU. For more
information, please contact jennifer.cox@du.edu,dig-commons@du.edu.

COMMERCIAL LAW
OVERVIEW

During the period covered by this Survey, the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals selected for publication several bankruptcy decisions and a few decisions in the other areas of commercial law, such as secured transactions and
consumer credit. A discussion of the bankruptcy cases provides the bulk of
this section. Because practitioners now have to contend with a new bankruptcy code' effective for actions filed on or after October 1, 1979, references
will be made to provisions of the new Act whenever possible.
Perhaps the most noteworthy event for the Tenth Circuit in the area of
bankruptcy law was the functional overruling of an earlier opinion, Ra/y V.
Nicholas (In re Nicholas), 2 by the United States Supreme Court in Brown v.

Felsen. 3 Nicholas held that, under the principle of res judicata, a creditor
would not be permitted to "go behind" the record and judgment of a state
court and present extrinsic evidence to the bankruptcy judge in an attempt
to show that the debt underlying the state court judgment was based upon
fraud. 4 Nicholas was followed in Brown . Felsen (In re Felsen),5 an unpub-

lished Tenth Circuit opinion, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari to
resolve the conflict between Niholas and subsequent opinions in other circuits. 6 The Supreme Court held that the doctrine of res judicata was inapplicable and that the bankruptcy court may look beyond the state court
record and judgment in making its determination of dischargeability. 7 This
conclusion is warranted, according to the Court, by the 1970 amendments to
the Bankruptcy Act which clearly made the adjudication of dischargeability
a federal matter; the language of these amendments is inconsistent with an
application of the policy of res judicata.8 In the first opinion to be discussed
herein, Wilke v. Winters (In re Winters), 9 the court of appeals distinguished
Nicholas.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

11 U.S.C.A. §§ 101-1330 (West Sp. Pamph. 1979).
denied, 421 U.S. 1012 (1975).
510 F.2d 160 (10th Cir.), cert.
99 S. Ct. 2205 (1979).
510 F.2d at 163.
No. 77-2035 (10th Cir. Apr. 14, 1978) (Not for Routine Publication).
Four other circuits, in post-Nicholardecisions, had allowed the bankruptcy judge to "go

behind" a state court judgment and look at extrinsic evidence in making a determination of
dischargeability. See Bailey v. Wright, 584 F.2d 83 (5th Cir. 1978); In re McMillan, 579 F.2d
289 (3d Cir. 1978); Houtman v. Mann, 568 F.2d 651 (9th Cir. 1978); and Hovermale v. Pigge,
539 F.2d 369 (4th Cir. 1976).
7. Brown v. Felsen, 99 S. Ct. at 2213.
8. Id. at 2211-12.
9. 586 F.2d 1363 (10th Cir. 1978).
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BANKRUPTCY

Exceptzon to Dicharge
1. Fraud

In Wilke v. Winters (In re Winters), 10 the debtors appealed from a district
court order directing that, upon remand, the bankruptcy judge conduct a
hearing to determine the dischargeability of a debt upon which a judgment
for fraud was obtained in the absence of the debtors and their counsel. The
debtors' attorney had received permission to withdraw the day before trial
because his clients had not been in contact with him and had, in fact, moved
without providing him with a forwarding address. The bankruptcy court
had originally declared this judgment void for lack of due process; the creditor appealed and the district court reversed on this issue, but held that the
judgment for fraud was not dispositive as to the dischargeability of the underlying debt." l On appeal to the Tenth Circuit, the court of appeals affirmed. The debtors argued unsuccessfully that permitting the creditor to
present evidence regarding the fraudulent nature of the actions for which
judgment was awarded disregarded the holding of an earlier Tenth Circuit
opinion, Raly v. Nicholas (In re Niholas).12 The court of appeals distinguished Nicholas' 3 as a case in which the original judgment was not for
fraud, and hence, the creditor was not allowed to "go behind" the state court
judgment; however, in the instant case the judgment was based upon fraud.
Addressing itself at length to the judgment declared void by the bankruptcy court, the court of appeals looked to two Colorado' 4 cases: Dalton v.
People' 5 and Thompson v. McCormick.' 6 In Dalton, the defendant was unaware, innocently, that his attorney had been permitted to withdraw. In
Thompson, the defendant had discharged his attorney and was totally uninformed since notice was served on the former counsel. It appears that the
court of appeals distinguished these cases from the instant one on the culpability issue: because the Winters had not kept their attorney informed as to
their whereabouts, they were responsible for the judgment entered against
them. The court relied upon the reasoning in Sunshine o. Robinson, in which a
judgment was obtained after counsel was allowed to withdraw immediately
10.

Id.
11. The power of the bankruptcy court to determine the dischargeability of a debt is found
in I1 U.S.C. § 35(c)(3) (1976) (added by Act of October 19, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-467, § 5-7, 84
Stat. 992). There is no such provision in the revised act; it was removed as unnecessary "in view
of the comprehensive grant of jurisdiction prescribed in . . . [28 U.S.C. § 1471(b)], which is
adequate to cover the full jurisdiction that the bankruptcy courts have today over dischargeability and related issues under Bankruptcy Act § 17c." S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d
Sess. 77, reprntted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 5787, 5863.
12. 510 F.2d 160 (10th Cir.), cert. dented, 421 U.S. 1012 (1975).
13. NiMcholas, of course, may no longer be valid in light of Brown v. Felsen, 99 S. Ct. 2205
(1979). After Brown, a creditor may be allowed to allege and prove fraud regardless of the basis
for the state court judgment.
14. The fraud action originated in Weld County district court and the parties stipulated
that Colorado law governed. 586 F.2d at 1365.
15. 146 Colo. 15, 360 P.2d 113 (1961).
16. 138 Colo. 434, 335 P.2d 265 (1959).
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prior to trial,
2.

7

and upheld the district court's judgment against Winters.

Willful and Malicious Conversion

18
The issue presented in Bank of Meeker v. McGinn's*(In re McGitnn's) was
whether the sale of cattle in violation of a security agreement constituted a
willful and malicious conversion-thereby rendering the underlying debt an
exception to discharge in bankruptcy 19 -in view of the bank's "knowledgeable acquiesence" 20 in the bankrupt's cattle trading and the bank's "failure to
,,2" In affirming the Distake reasonable steps to protect its collateral ....
trict Court for the Western District of Oklahoma, the court of appeals, per
Judge McKay, held that the conduct of the creditor bank defeated its
claims.

The security agreement between McGinnis and the bank forbade the
sale of the cattle without the written consent of bank; however, the testimony
before the bankruptcy court revealed the common understanding that the
collateral could be sold if the proceeds were used to reduce the loan balance.
In its testimony the bank denied knowledge of the bankrupt's cattle trading;
but the district court found, and the court of appeals agreed, that there was
sufficient evidence, such as deposits into McGinnis' account and increases in
the size of his herd, for the bank to be held to that knowledge. Relying upon
Bennett v. W. T Grant,22 the court of appeals concluded that the equity principles under which the bankruptcy court operates dictate that an exception to
discharge is unwarranted for a creditor in the position of the Bank of
Meeker.
The court summarily rejected the bank's contention that any unautho23
Davis v.
rized sale of collateral is per se a willful and malicious conversion.
24
Aetna Acceptance Co. articulated the standard to which the court of appeals
17.

168 Colo. 409, 451 P.2d 757 (1969). Counsel withdrew because his clients were in

prison and he alleged an agreement whereby he was not to represent them at trial.
18. 586 F.2d 162 (10th Cir. 1978).
19. 11 U.S.C. § 35(a)(2) (1976). The revised Bankruptcy Act contains basically the same
provision. Any debt "for willful and malicious injury by the debtor to another entity or to the

property of another entity" is excepted from discharge. II U.S.C.A. § 523(a)(6) (West Sp.
Pamph. 1979). See S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 79, repntied in [1978] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 5787, 5865.
20. 586 F.2d at 165.
21. Id.
22. 481 F.2d 664 (4th Cir. 1973) (per curiam). In this case, there was a conditional sales
contract on some appliances, title to which remained in W.T. Grant. Bennett traded in the
appliances on a mobile home, after Grant refused to repossess them. The court, after noting
that the evidence showed this to be a willful and malicious conversion, stated that if the creditor
had known of the conversion and failed to act, the underlying debt should be discharged in
bankruptcy. Two recent cases concerning creditor conduct are In re Jantz, 2 BANKR. L. REP.
(CCH) 1 67,160 (W.D. Okla. June 15, 1979) (bank could not claim a willful and malicious
conversion because it had in the past permitted the use of the accounts receivable, in which it
had a security interest, for the payment of ongoing obligations) and In re Gawne, [1977-1978

Transfer Binder] BANKR. L. REP. (CCH)
had granted to the debtor the right to sell
willful and malicious conversion).
23. Creditors, of course, have argued
Transfer Binder] BANKR. L. REP. (CCH)
24. 293 U.S. 328 (1934).

66, 535 (W.D. Wis. July 20, 1977) (a creditor who
collateral without accountability could not claim a
for this rule before. See, e.g., In re Cote, [1977-1978
66,349 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 8, 1977).
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adhered: "[a] willful and malicious injury does not follow as of course from
every act of conversion, without reference to the circumstances

....

There

may be an honest, but mistaken belief, engendered by a course
of dealing,
25
that powers have been enlarged or incapacities removed."
B.

Subordination of Claimis-Majority Shareholder

In Sinclair v. Barr (In re Mid-Town Produce Temtnal),26 the court of appeals was asked to decide whether, under the equitable powers of the bankruptcy court, 2 7 a secured claim based upon an advance made to a failing
corporation and used to pay other secured creditors could be subordinated
merely because the advance was made by a dominant shareholder. The
bankruptcy court had disallowed the claim in its entirety; the district court
reversed on the disallowance issue, but subordinated the claim and denied
the security interest. The court of appeals, per Judge Logan, reversed and
remanded, holding that it would be contrary to sound business and social
policy not to permit a controlling shareholder to advance sums to a corporation and become a legitimate secured creditor absent, of course, evidence
that the loan was really a contribution to capital or that the transaction was
of such character as to invalidate the lien.
G. Sinclair, his wife, and their son, R. Sinclair, owned all the stock of
Mid-Town Produce in February 1975 when G. Sinclair deposited $20,000
into his son's personal account. R. Sinclair, in turn, paid the money to MidTown so that the company's secured creditors could receive partial repayment. A security agreement was executed, giving G. Sinclair a security interest in Mid-Town's accounts receivable; this agreement was signed by R.
Sinclair as president, even though he did not become president until June
1975, at which time all the stock was transferred to him. G. Sinclair signed
the agreement in August 1975 and it was filed several days later. In Decem28
ber 1975, Mid-Town's bankruptcy proceedings began.
The threshold question, as the court of appeals saw it, was whether the
advance was a loan or a contribution to capital. 29 Since facts relevant to this
inquiry were not available to the court on appeal, the case was remanded for
this determination. 30 However, the court went on to discuss, in terms of
subordination, the consequences if the advance were found to be debt rather
25. Id. at 332.
26. 599 F.2d 389 (10th Cir. 1979).

27. The courts have evolved the principles of equitable subordination by bankruptcy
judges. See Sampsell v. Imperial Paper & Color Corp., 313 U.S. 215 (1941); Pepper v. Litton,
308 U.S. 295 (1939). It was the intent of the framers of the revised Bankruptcy Act to codify
this case law. See generall, 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPrcY 510.04 (15th ed. 1979). The revised
act reads in relevant part: "[Tihe court may-(1) under principles of equitable subordination,
subordinate for purposes of distribution all or part of an allowed claim to all or part of another
claim or all or part of an allowed interest to all or part of another allowed interest .... 11
U.S.C.A. § 510(c) (West Sp. Pamph. 1979).
28. 599 F.2d at 391.

29. 599 F.2d at 393.
30. The court said that two factors, inter ah'a,
should be considered: the interest rate on the

loan and the repayment schedule. 599 F.2d at 393-94. The facts as presented by the Tenth
Circuit do not indicate whether undercapitalization is a problem. However, in the opinion, two
cases relied upon by the district court are distinguished from the instant case because they dealt
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than contribution to capital. In its discussion,3 ' the court appeared to ignore
the secured nature of the claim 3 2 and focused upon the powers of the bankruptcy court in utilizing the equitable subordination doctrine to postpone
payment of some creditors' claims. The court should have made clear in its
opinion that, in bankruptcy proceedings, security interests are invalidated, if
at all, if they were created in violation of the pertinent bankruptcy provisions33 and not because of the exercise of the equitable subordination powers
34
of the bankruptcy court.
C.

Chapter X-Notice to Creditors

In March of 1974, Gulf South Corporation and its subsidiaries, one of
which was Gulf South Advisors, Ltd. (GSA), filed a petition seeking reorganization under Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act.35 May 31, 1974 was set as
the date after which creditors' claims would be barred if filed. The Kays,
who were owners of Gulf South Mortgage Investors (GSMI), of which GSA
was advisor, were not scheduled as creditors of GSA and hence were not
notified. Publication did appear in the Wall StreetJournal and other newspapers. In February of 1975, the Kays filed a plenary action alleging lob-5
violations by GSA and seeking damages. The lawsuit was stayed. Two
months later, the trustee, via his attorney, told the Kays to apply for permission to file a late claim. More than one year later the Kays filed this application, which was turned down in November 1976 by the reorganization court.
At this time, the reorganization plan had not yet been filed.
On appeal from this rejection, the Kays argued, first, that they should
have been notified because they were GSMI owners and, second, that they
were entitled to receive actual notice of the reorganization and its developments once the trustee knew of their claim.
In Kay v. Hogan (In re Gulico Investment Corp.),36 the court of appeals, per
Judge Doyle, rejected these arguments and said that notice to "all owners of
all the affiliated entities when the existence of their claims is unknown"37 is
with gross undercapitalization, Braddy v. Randolph, 352 F.2d 80 (4th Cir. 1965) and In re
Sterling House, Inc., 356 F. Supp. 1113 (W.D. Va. 1973).
31. 599 F.2d at 393-94.
32. All of the opinions cited by the Sizdair court deal with the unsecured claims of majority shareholders. E.g., Frasher v. Robinson, 458 F.2d 492 (10th Cir.), cert. dnid,409 U.S. 1009
(1972); Spach v. Bryant, 309 F.2d 886 (5th Cir. 1962); and Forbush v. Bartley, 78 F.2d 805 (5th
Cir. 1935).
33. A security interest will be invalidated if there is a violation of the Bankruptcy Act
preference provision, II U.S.C. § 96 (1976), or the fraudulent transfer provision, II U.S.C.

§ 107(l)(1) (1976).
34. This opinion appears to be a portent of the possible resolution of similar cases arising
under the equitable subordination provisions of the new Bankruptcy Act. Secured creditors
may become subject, due to creditor misconduct, to an application of the doctrine of equitable
subordination.
The new Act provides that the court may "order that any lien securing such a subordinated
claim be transferred to the estate." 11 U.S.C. § 510(c)(2) (West Sp. Pamph. 1979).
35. 1I U.S.C. §§ 501-676 (1976). In the revised Bankruptcy Act, the formerly separate
reorganization chapters are consolidated into one. 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 1101-1174 (West Sp. Pamph.
1979).
36. 593 F.2d 933 (10th Cir. 1979).
37. 593 F.2d at 935.
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not necessary and that since the Kays were aware of the reorganization proceedings, they were obligated to pursue their claim. The court then distinguished three of the opinions relied upon by the frustrated creditors, City of
New York v. New York, N.H & HR. Co., 3 8 In re Intaco Puerto Rico, Inc., 39 and
"Harbor Tank Storage Co. 40 as cases in which the trustee failed to provide no'4 1
tice after he became aware of a creditor's "unsatisfied meritorious claims."
In the instant case, the trustee told the Kays that they should file a request
for permission to file a late claim; this was the Kays' notice, which they failed
to heed. The court was reluctant, on equitable grounds, to allow an extension to persons who had already delayed for two years without a sound reason.

42

D.

Chapter XAI-Opposition to Arrangement

In Gardens of Cortez v.John Hancock Mutual Life InsuranceCo. (In re Gardensof
Cortez),43 the court of appeals held that a bankruptcy judge may dismiss a
petition for a real property arrangement under Chapter XII of the Bankruptcy Act-without giving the debtor an opportunity to present an alternative plan-if the debtor had already submitted one plan that was
unanimously rejected, and by the time of the hearing, the debtor had settled
his claims with the unsecured creditors, thereby leaving only one class of
creditors consisting of two secured parties, one of whom held 90% of the
secured indebtedness and who was unalterably opposed to any plan.
Relying upon two Ninth Circuit cases 45 that held that dismissal is
proper if there are no classes assenting to a proposed plan and the likelihood
of acceptance is remote, the court thought inapplicable the earlier Tenth
Circuit opinion, Rader v. Boyd,46 offered in support by the debtor. Rader held
that there was nothing in the law to prevent a debtor from tendering an
alternative Chapter XII plan and that the court "in the wise exercise of its
38. 344 U.S. 293 (1953). In this railroad reorganization case, which held that notice by
publication was inadequate since property liens would be destroyed, the Court said that "even
creditors who have knowledge of a reorganization have a right to assume that the statutory
'reasonable notice' will be given to them before their claims are forever barred." Id. at 297.
39. 494 F.2d 94 (1st Cir. 1974). The creditor here had actual knowledge of the existence of
a Chapter X proceeding; however, the court said that "the fact that the creditor may, as here,

be generally aware of the pending reorganization, does not of itself impose upon him an affirmative burden to intervene . . . and present his claim. The trustee cannot avoid his statutory
responsibility under Chapter X, to formally provide the required notice, simply because of a
creditor's possible familiarity with general aspects of the proceeding." Id. at 99.
40. 385 F.2d 111 (3d Cir. 1967). The attorneys of the creditors here communicated with

the trustee at various times during a Chapter X proceeding. The court said "a creditor has
every right to assume that he will be sent all the notices to which he is entitled under the Act."
Id. at 115.
41. 593 F.2d at 935.
42. Id.
43. 585 F.2d 975 (10th Cir. 1978).
44. 11 U.S.C. §§801-926 (1976).
45. Owners of"SW 8" Real Estate v. McQuaid, 513 F.2d 558 (9th Cir. 1975) and Taylor v.
Wood, 458 F.2d 15 (9th Cir. 1972). &eal.ro Kunze v. Prudential Ins. Co., 106 F.2d 917 (5th Cir.

1939).
46. 267 F.2d 911 (10th Cir. 1959). Rader was remanded because the bankruptcy judge did
not follow the proper procedure in his adjudication.
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discretion ' 4 7 may allow the debtor to propose as many plans as the judge
deems appropriate. In Gardens, however, the major secured creditor indicated he would veto any plan; therefore, the profferring of another proposal
would be useless.
The second issue presented to the court of appeals concerned the applicability of the "cram down" provision of the Bankruptcy Act. 48 The court
followed the line of cases that stand for the proposition that "cram down" is
49
inapplicable when the secured creditors are unanimously opposed.
E.

Jurisdiction

United States v. Wilshire Apartments, Inc. 50 is being discussed in this section
because the court of appeals, inexplicably, used bankruptcy law principles
regarding summary jurisdiction to decide the case.
In July 1970, the Federal National Mortgage Association (FNMA) recorded its mortgage on the Wilshire property. Six years later, in January
1976, Medical Center State Bank lent Wilshire money secured in part by
certificates of deposit. The United States, to which Wilshire's mortgage had
been assigned by the FNMA, effected the appointment of a receiver for Wilshire in December 1976. At this time, the bank held $5370.75 in certificates
which, under the terms of its loan agreement, it applied to the loan; it then
submitted the balance, in the amount of $267.83, to the receiver. The
United States contended that the certificates should be turned over because
they were an asset of Wilshire at the time of the appointment of the receiver;
the bank, of course, argued that they were not an asset and cited Bowles v.
Czty NationalBank & Trust Co. ,"' a recent Oklahoma case.
After several orders and responses, the district court for the District of
Oklahoma entered its order directing the bank to turn over to the receiver
the remaining certificates because they were an asset of Wilshire in December 1976. The bank complied and appealed.
47. Id. at 914.
48. This provision reads, in relevant part:
An arrangement(11) shall provide for any class of creditors which is affected by and does not
accept the arrangement by the two-thirds majority in amount required under this
chapter, adequate protection for the realization by them of the value of their debts
against the property dealt with by the arrangement and affected by such debts, either,
as provided in the arrangement or in the order confirming the arrangement ...
11 U.S.C. § 861 (11) (1976).
49. E.g., Meyer v. Rowen, 195 F.2d 263 (10th Cir. 1952); In re Herweg, 119 F.2d 941 (7th
Cir. 1941); In re Spicewood Assocs., 445 F. Supp. 564 (N.D. Il1. 1977); In re Georgetown Apts., 3
BANKR. CT. DEC. 512 (M.D. Fla. July 12, 1977). Other cases hold that if any of the secured
creditors object, there can be no plan. Preas v. Kirkpatrick & Burns, 115 F.2d 802 (6th Cir.
1940); In re Bekare Realty Assocs., 3 BANKR. CT. DEC. 646 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 23, 1977). Cf, In re
Hobson Pike Assocs., Ltd., 3 BANKR. CT. DEC. 1205 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 20, 1977) and Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Marietta Cobb Apts. Co. (In re Marietta Cobb Apts. Co.), 3 BANKR.
CT. DEC. 720 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 9, 1977) (both holding that "cram-down" can be used against the
sole creditor if there is adequate protection.) See generally Gilbert & Massari, ChapterXII "CramDown'--Bad Aledtine orJust Desserts.', 52 AM. BANKR. L.J. 99 (1978).
50. 590 F.2d 876 (10th Cir. 1979).
51. 537 P.2d 1219 (Okla. Ct. App. 1975). The payee had used two $200,000 notes as security for a loan and had endorsed them over to City Bank. The court held that, here, the payee's
receiver was not entitled to the two notes until the loan was paid off.
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The court of appeals reversed and remanded for a plenary hearing on
the bank's claim. In its analysis, the court depended upon cases defining the
summary jurisdiction powers of the bankruptcy courts. 5 2 The court concluded that the district erred in ordering the bank to surrender the certificates in a summary proceeding, in light of possession by a third party with a
colorable claim adverse to the receiver.
The court also rejected the contention of the United States that the
turn-over directive was a non-appealable order. 53 The economic assets of
Wilshire were very limited, and if the receiver were allowed to keep the certificates and pay other obligations with the funds, the bank might suffer "irreparable loss and injury."' 54 Therefore, the court reasoned, the order
55
materially affected the bank's rights and was appealable.
The concurring opinion of Judge McKay pointed out that bankruptcy
jurisdiction principles, while persuasive, are not controlling in the instant
case. 56 While noting that, here, the applicable rule is the same for receivership and bankruptcy proceedings, 57 the concurring opinion also looked to a
receivership case, Cusack v. PrudentialInsurance Co. 58 Cusack held that a receiver could not utilize a summary proceeding to gain possession of property
59
held by third persons claiming adversely.
F.

Secured Transactions in Bankruptcy Context
1.

Filing Requirements

In Lentz v. Bank of Independence (In re Kerr),6° the court of appeals was
asked to decide whether, in light of 1975 amendments to the Kansas UCC
provisions, 6 1 the earlier holding in Commerce Bank V. Chambers (In re Littlejohn) 62 should be abandoned. In Commerce Bank, the court of appeals held
52. Phelps v. United States, 421 U.S. 330 (1975); Cline v. Kaplan, 323 U.S. 97 (1944);
Messenger v. Frontier Plumbing & Heating (In re Fox Metal Indus., Inc.), 453 F.2d 1128 (10th
Cir. 1972). These cases stand for the proposition that if a third party is in possession and claims
adversely to the receiver or trustee in bankruptcy, then the third party has the right to have his
claim adjudicated in a plenary action. See also Western Bd. of Adjusters v. Clements (Inre
Desert Paint & Supply Co.), 479 F.2d 45 (9th Cir. 1973); First Nat'l Bank v. Bailes (In re Amer.
Southern Pub. Co.), 426 F.2d 160 (5th Cir.), cert. dented, 400 U.S. 903 (1970); Hollywood Nat'l
Bank v. Bumb, 409 F.2d 23 (9th Cir. 1969). The question of summary versus plenary jurisdiction is academic now because the revised Act provides that the bankruptcy court has "exclusive
jurisdiction of all of the property, wherever located, of the debtor.
...
28 U.S.C.A. § 1471(e)
(West Sp. Pamph. 1979).
53. 590 F.2d at 881-82.
54. Id. at 882.
55. See, e.g., In re Brissette, 561 F.2d 779 (9th Cir. 1977) (interlocutory orders arising in
bankruptcy proceedings are appealable if they do not arise in controversies in bankruptcy proceedings); Young Properties Corp. v. United Equity Corp., 534 F.2d 847 (9th Cir.), cert.
denzed,
429 U.S. 830 (1976); Sherr v. Sierra Trading Corp., 492 F.2d 971 (10th Cir. 1974) (in a bankruptcy proceeding, an interlocutory order that determines some right or duty is appealable).
56. 590 F.2d at 883.
57. Id.
58. 192 Okla. 218, 134 P.2d 984 (1943).
59. 192 Okla. at 221, 134 P.2d at 987. See also 2 R. CLARK, A TREATISE ON THE LAW AND
PRACTICE OF RECEIVERS § 632 (3d ed. 1959).

60. 598 F.2d 1206 (10th Cir. 1979).
61. Ch. 32, 1975 Kan. Sess. Laws § 2 (amending KAN. STAT. ANN. § 8 4-9 -302( 3 )(c) (1965).
62. 519 F.2d 356 (10th Cir. 1975).
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that a lender's lien upon an automobile was perfected when the lender effected a notation of the lien on either the bill of sale or the former owner's
title. The court in Commerce Bank balanced the rather complicated transfer
of title process63 against the lender's concern for having a perfected security
interest and decided that the bank had done all it could to protect its interest. "We cannot hold that the burden of assembling all these items is to be
'64
placed upon the lienholder bank."
In Lentz, which presented essentially the same factual situation as Commerce Bank, the bank did not fare as well as the lender. The purchasers in
Lentz did not apply for a Kansas title at all after buying their automobile in
August 1976. In November 1976, when they were adjudicated bankrupt, the
bankruptcy court and the district court held that, under Commerce Bank, the
bank's security interest had been perfected via the lien notation on the former owner's title. The Tenth Circuit reversed in light of a new statutory
perfecting procedure available to banks which lend money for automobile
purchases.
The 1975 amendments-which became effective after Commerce Bank
was decided 65 -provide
an alternate, simple, and inexpensive method
whereby a lender could protect his lien in the interim between the purchase
of an automobile and the issuance of a new certificate of title: "the mailing
or delivery by a dealer or secured party to the appropriate state agency of a
66
notice of security interest as prescribed by K.S.A. 8-135 ....
Assuming that a statute that placed the status of a lender's lien in the
hands of the debtor was contrary to the philosophy of the UCC, the court of
appeals in Lentz reasoned that the Kansas legislature sought to remedy this
situation by amending its code to allow lenders the initiative in the perfection of their liens. The Lentz court construed the 1975 amendments as requir67
14g
the lender to use this alternative if it wants its liens perfected in the
interim between purchase and title application.
Commerce Bank presented many problems when it was decided, 68 many
of which were taken care of by the 1975 amendments and Lentz. The Lentz
case is a warning for all Kansas lenders that failure to remit this notice of
security agreement could mean an unperfected lien and an unsecured claim
in bankruptcy court.
2.

Retention of Collateral

The creditor had sold a retail store to the bankrupts and maintained a
63. Documents that need to be presented are: "application for an original certificate of
title, a title fee, bill of sale showing the bank's lien, application for registration of the car, registration fee, proof of payment of personal property taxes, and evidence of tax assessment of the
automobile." 598 F.2d at 1207-08.

64. 519 F.2d at 358.
65. Chapter 32 of the 1975 Kansas session laws was effective Jan. 1, 1976. Commerce Bank
was decided June 25, 1975.

66. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 84-9-302(3)(c) (Supp. 1978).
67. 598 F.2d at 1209.
68. See generaly Comment, In re Littlejohn: Equitable Departure From State Certiate of Tile
Act Filing Requirements, 1975 UTAH L. REV. 726.
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security interest in the store assets. The bankrupts agreed to keep the inventory at the level of the time of sale; it was also agreed that if the inventory
level declined, the creditor had the right to repossess. Less than two years
later, the bankrupts returned the store keys to With, the creditor, saying that
they were giving up trying to make the business successful; they refused to
listen to With's offer of help. With closed the store and reopened one week
later. The difference between the value of the inventory at time of sale and
upon repossession was approximately $12,000, the amount which which
With claimed should be excepted from discharge 69 in bankruptcy proceedings because of willful and malicious conversion.
The bankruptcy referee found that the decrease in inventory level and
accounts receivable was so excessive as to be characterized as prima facie
"willful and malicious;" 70 that a substantial inventory decrease had occurred within the three months prior to the repossession; and that the bankrupts had wasted the assets and used the proceeds for themselves. 71 The
referee declared the debt non-dischargeable; the District Court for the District of New Mexico agreed and the Tenth Circuit affirmed in Wzih v.
72
Amador.
The court of appeals held that With "had a security interest in . . . the
inventory, the level of which the [bankrupts] had agreed to maintain at
$23,209.23. When the inventory was sold down to below that level, [With's]
security interest in the inventory was converted to that extent."' 73 Because
this conversion could be characterized as willful and malicious, the converted amount is a debt not dischargeable in bankruptcy.
The court rejected the bankrupts' contention that With had elected to
repossess and retain the collateral in full satisfaction of their obligation. The
court said that § 50A-9-505(2) 74 of the New Mexico statutes was not applicable here because 1) the debtors had practically forced With to repossess by
foisting the keys upon him; 2) the total collateral repossessed was worth approximately one half of the amount still owed to With, so selling it would be
75
fruitless; and 3) it would be inequitable.
69. The pertinent language in the Bankruptcy Act is: "A discharge in bankruptcy shall
release a bankrupt from all of his provable debts, whether allowable in full or in part, except
such as . . . are liabilities . . . for willful and malicious conversion of the property of another

.
§ 35(a)(2) (1976).
.... 11 U.S.C.
70. With v. Amador (In re Amador), 596 F.2d 428, 430 (10th Cir. 1979).

71.
72.
73.
74.

Id.
596 F.2d 428 (10th Cir. 1979).
Id. at 431.
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 50A-9-505(2) provides:

[A] secured party in possession may, after default, propose to retain the collateral in
satisfaction of the obligation. Written notice of such proposal shall be sent to the
debtor ....
If the debtor or other person entitled to receive notification objects ...
the secured party must dispose of the collateral ....
In the absence of such written

objection the secured party may retain the collateral in satisfaction of the debtor's
obligation.
The identical provision is now found at N.M. STAT. ANN. § 55-9-505(2) (Michie 1978).
75. Generally, § 9-505(2) of the UCC does not operate to deny creditors their rights. See
Nelson v. Armstrong, 99 Idaho 422, 582 P.2d 1100 (1978) (creditor must manifest an intent to

retain the collateral); Harris v. Bower, 266 Md. 579, 295 A.2d 870 (1972) (because creditor did
not propose to retain the collateral and it would not be in his best interests to do so, the debt
was not extinguished); Jones v. Morgan, 58 Mich. App. 455, 228 N.W.2d 419 (1975) (§ 9-505(2)
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A.

UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE

Article Nine-Conversion by Auction Company

An interesting Article Nine case is Secunty National Bank v. Belleville Livestock Commission. 7 6 The bank held security agreements with a cattle feeder
on almost a thousand head of cattle and the proceeds therefrom. The agreement provided that the cattle could not be sold without the written consent
of the bank. There was deposition testimony indicating that the bank knew
Larkin, the cattle feeder, was buying and selling cattle at auction but failed
to remonstrate with him and also knew that the bank permitted the sales as
long as the proceeds were applied to the loan balance.77 The bank brought
an action in conversion 78 against three livestock auction companies and was
granted summary judgment in the District Court for the District of Kansas.
On appeal to the Tenth Circuit, the court held that the bank did not impliedly waive its security interest via its course of conduct and failure to
remonstrate with the debtor. The court also held that the bank may have
waived its security interest through an express authorization to sell the cattle, and thus, the auction companies-as agents of the debtor-could not be
guilty of conversion. Because there was a genuine issue as to whether the
bank consented to the sales, the court set aside the summary judgment and
remanded.
The court of appeals chose to rely upon North Central Kansas Production
Credit Association v. Washington Sales Co. ,79 in which the Kansas Supreme
Court said that an implied waiver of a security interest cannot be shown,
without more, from a creditor's failure to remonstrate with a debtor for violating the security agreement and the creditor's acceptance of the proceeds
of unauthorized sales.
The auction companies based their argument on Clovis National Bank v.
Thomas,80 an earlier New Mexico opinion, that held a course of dealing by a
bank effected the waiver of both the consent requirement and its security
interest in the cattle.81
Understandably, the court rejected Cloves 82 in favor of the recent Kanwas "drafted for the benefit of the secured party ....
A debtor who has been damaged by
improper retention of collateral finds his remedy in U.C.C. § 9-507(l) ....
Id. at 461, 228
N.W.2d at 423). Contra, Moran v. Holman, 514 P.2d 817 (Alaska 1973) (retention for a long
period of time of depreciating collateral, such as a motor vehicle, and personal use of it allows
the debtor to claim that the debt is extinguished) and Northern Financial Corp. v. Chatwood
Coffee Shop, Inc., 4 U.C.C. REP. SERv. 674 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1967) (a debtor is not barred from
claiming that the creditor retained the collateral in full satisfaction of the debt even though the
creditor did not give notice that he was doing so). See generaly Annot., Construction and Operation
of UICC § 9-505(2) Authorizing Secured Party in Possession of Collateral to Retain It in Satisfaction of
Obliation, 55 A.L.R.3d 651 (1974).

76. No. 76-2113, 76-2114, 76-2115 (10th Cir., filed May 4, 1979).
77. Id. at 18-20.
78.

See generally Annot., Personal Liability ofAuctioneer to Owner or Mortgageefor Conversion, 96

A.L.R.2d 208 (1964).
79. 223 Kan. 689, 577 P.2d 35 (1979).
80. 77 N.M. 554, 425 P.2d 726 (1967).
81. See also Planters Prod. Credit Ass'n v. Bowles, 256 Ark. 1063, 511 S.W.2d 645 (1974)
and Lisbon Bank & Trust Co. v. Murray, 206 N.W.2d 96 (Iowa 1973).
82. Clos created a legal disturbance and § 50A-9-306(2) of the New Mexico code was
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sas law found in Washington Sales. In Washington Sales, a finding of express
consent was based upon testimony by the president of the lending association that he told the debtor that cattle sales were permissible as long as the
proceeds were applied to the loan balance. In Security National, the court
concluded that there was a material issue as to whether the bank expressly
consented to the sales; the bank representative testified that Larkin had sold
cattle previously on many occasions with the bank's consent.
III.
A.

OTHER DECISIONS BRIEFLY NOTED

Truth-In-Lending

In Gallegos v. Stokes, 8 3 the Tenth Circuit held that the purchase of a
truck by a poorly educated widow who wanted to begin selling fresh produce
and who was able to buy the truck only by trading in her car and some
jewelry was a consumer credit transaction for purposes of the Truth-InLending8 4 disclosure provisions. 85 The court also held that a creditor who
did not have a review procedure or any other mechanism whereby calculation errors could be caught could not avail himself of the "bona fide error"
defense

B.

8 6

to a Truth-In-Lending violation.

8 7

Miler Act

United States ex rel Olmstead Electric, Inc. v. Neosho Construction Co. 88 was a
Miller Act8 9 case in which the Tenth Circuit held that a supplier's claim was
amended in 1968 by the addition of this sentence: "A security interest in farm products and the
proceeds thereof shall not be considered waived by the secured party by any course of dealing
between the parties or by any trade usage." 1968 N.M. Laws ch. 12, § 2. Clovzs has not always
been followed; see, e.g., Colorado Bank & Trust Co. v. Western Slope Inv., Inc., 36 Colo. App.
149, 539 P.2d 501 (1975) (non-enforcement of provision requiring written consent to sell does
not effect a waiver of that provision) and Southwest Washington Prod. Credit Ass'n v. SeattleFirst Nat'l Bank, 92 Wash. 2d 30, 593 P.2d 167 (1979) (Non-enforced written consent provision;
however, the court reasoned that the bank's consent to sales was conditioned upon receipt of the
proceeds. "The UCC does not prevent a second party from attaching such a condition or limitation to its consent to sales of collateral by a debtor. A sale by the debtor in violation of those
conditions is an unauthorized sale and the security interest, under § 9-306(2), continues in the
collateral." 593 P.2d at 169 (citations omitted)). Clovin has also been criticized for its holding
that the common law of waiver supplements the Code. See, e.g., Swift & Co. v. Jamestown Nat'l
Bank, 426 F.2d 1099 (8th Cir. 1970) ("Section 9-306(2) serves as a codification of the common
law of waiver." 426 F.2d at 1103-04.) and United States v. Greenwich Mill & Elevator Co., 291
F. Supp. 609 (N.D. Ohio 1968) (Clovts goes too far in its "continuance of the doctrine of
waiver." 291 F. Supp. at 614.)
83. 593 F.2d 372 (10th Cir. 1979).
84. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1644 (1976).
85. 593 F.2d at 375.
86. A creditor who proves that "the violation was not intentional and resulted from a bona
fide error notwithstanding the maintenance of procedures reasonably adapted to avoid any such
error" is not liable under the Truth-In-Lending disclosure provisions. 15 U.S.C. § 1640(c)
(1976).
87. The court relied upon Mirabal v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 537 F.2d 871 (7th
Cir. 1976). See also Detillo v. J.R. Moore Farm Supply Co., 449 F. Supp. 559 (W.D. Pa. 1978).
88. 599 F.2d 930 (10th Cir. 1979).
89. 40 U.S.C. §§ 270a-270d (1976). The Miller Act provides financial protection to persons who supply labor or materials to either the prime contractor or the subcontractor in the
performance of a government contract by requiring the posting of a payment bond by the
government contractor.
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barred because notice to the general contractor was provided more than
9°
ninety days after the supplier's last unpaid shipment to the subcontractor.
One month before he gave notice, the supplier had delivered to the general
contractor electrical supplies that had been ordered by the subcontractor.
The general contractor paid the supplier for the equipment, and thus, this
purchase was not to be included in any claims the supplier might have. Because there were no other unpaid shipments within the ninety days prior to
the supplier's notice, the supplier's claim was defeated for untimeliness.
The dissenting opinion of Judge Logan pointed out that there were only
two ways by which the supplier could have protected his claim: 1) refuse
payment from the general contractor so that a recent charge would be outstanding or 2) give notice, routinely, whenever accounts are almost ninety
days old. 9 1
C.

Uniform Bill of Lading

The court, in Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway v. Littleton Leasing &
Investment Co. ,92 held that letters9 3 to the carrier from the shipper in response
to "past-due" notices from the carrier's credit department for unpaid freight
charges did not constitute compliance with the written notice of claim requirement of the uniform bill of lading which formed the parties' contract.
The dissent of Judge McKay indicates that he would characterize the letters
as in compliance because they did give notice of damage incurred, notwithstanding that they were directed to the wrong department within the car94
rier's large organization.
Linda K Calloway

90. The applicable notice provision is:
[A]ny person having direct contractual relationship with a subcontractor but no contractual relationship express or implied with the contractor furnishing said payment
bond shall have a right of action upon the said payment bond upon giving written
notice to said contractor within ninety days from the date on which such person did or
performed the last of the labor or furnished or supplied the last of the material for
which such claim is made ...
40 U.S.C. § 270b(a) (1976).
91. 599 F.2d at 934.
92. 582 F.2d 1237 (10th Cir. 1978).
93. One of the letters to the railway company's credit manager stated that several damage
claims were pending and another said that the shipper was awaiting credit memoranda before
making payment. The carrier's credit department's response to the first letter was that the
freight charges were separate from any damage claims that the shipper may have had; the
carrier's response to the second letter was that, according to their freight claim department, no
claims by the shipper were pending.
94. 582 F.2d at 1241-42.

